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In a two-country model, I analyze international environmental agreements
when a country’s emission abatement costs are private information and partic-
ipation to an agreement is voluntary. I show that the presence of asymmetric
information may prevent countries from reaching a first-best agreement if this
information asymmetry is too high. I propose a new channel to restore the
feasibility of the first-best agreement: pre-play communication. By revealing
its abatement cost through a certification agency in a pre-play communica-
tion stage, a country commits not to misreport this abatement cost during the
negotiations of an agreement. Hence, following certification by at least one
country, information asymmetry is reduced. Certification restores the feasi-
bility of the first-best agreement except for intermediate levels of information
asymmetry. For those levels, one country undergoing certification is not al-
ways sufficient to restore the feasibility of the first-best but it is impossible
to find transfers between countries such that they both optimally accept to
undergo certification. One country has always an incentive to free-ride on the
other country’s certification.
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information disclosure
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1 Introduction
The classical explanation for the failure of international negotiations on environmen-
tal issues is the free-rider problem: countries have the possibility to opt out of the
negotiations while still enjoying the benefits of the global agreement. It is well-known
from the mechanism design literature that inefficiencies arising from the free-rider
problem are particularly relevant in contexts plagued by information asymmetry.
For example, Rob (1989), and Mailath and Postlewaite (1990) stress the role of par-
ticipation constraints to generate inefficiency. However, international environmental
agreements are generally preceded by discussion rounds during which concerned par-
ties do not negotiate pollution abatement targets but can communicate with each
other and exchange information. This paper takes a mechanism design approach
and studies the effect of asymmetric information about pollution abatement costs
on the feasibility of an efficient environmental agreement when participation to this
agreement is voluntary and when countries can communicate before negotiations
start.
In the case of international environmental agreements, information asymmetry
can also be a problem for negotiating this type of agreement. Information asymmetry
can be understood as a lack of real knowledge about abatement options and costs
available in other countries. For example, Espinola-Arredondo and Munoz-Garcia
(2012) suggest that, in the context of climate change, the penetration rate of clean
technologies along all industries in a specific country, and so the abatement cost of
this country, is difficult to observe by outsiders. Information asymmetry can also be
interpreted in a broader sense as the political cost necessary to implement a certain
level of emission abatement (i.e. countries may have private information about
the relative weight of environmental problems in governments’ agenda).1 Whatever
the source of information asymmetry, this will be an issue for the negotiations of
abatement targets. Countries have an incentive to exaggerate their privately known
pollution abatement cost (or understate their privately known abatement benefit)
in order to reduce the effort they have to supply and leave most of the burden of
abatement on other countries.
Another characteristic of international environmental agreement is the fact
that international cooperation develops overtime (see Wagner, 2001). This develop-
ment usually follows a particular pattern: countries first agree on an initial agree-
1See for example Konrad and Thum (2014).
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ment, i.e. an umbrella convention, that generally does not contain any countries’
emission reduction targets but sets up the institutions entitled to gather information
transmitted by countries and to negotiate all subsequent emission reduction targets.
In a second stage, countries negotiate an agreement with emission reduction targets
and financial or technology transfers.
In the context of climate change negotiations, countries first agreed on the
United Nation Framework Convention on Climate Change that in particular es-
tablished the Conference of Parties as a supreme body entitled to negotiate all
subsequent protocols and amendments. By signing the UNFCCC, industrialized
countries committed themselves to provide the Conference of the Parties with clear
data about their greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions and about regional programmes
containing measures to mitigate climate change and with information related to
implementation (which could give an indication of the political willingness to im-
plement emission reductions). A subsidiary body of the UNFCCC was in charge of
assessing this information, which was thus at least partially verifiable. In a second
stage, countries negotiated the Kyoto Protocol. Other examples are the Convention
of Long-Range Transboundary Air-Pollution (LRTAP) or the Vienna Convention
for the Protection of the Ozone Layer (which preceded the Montreal protocol). Un-
der the LRTAP Convention, the concerned parties set up an emission monitoring
system under the auspices of the United Nations Economic Commission for Europe
before negotiating the first protocol with emission reduction targets. The Vienna
Convention established the UNEP as a secretariat and asked this body to convene
workshops to develop a more common understanding of factors affecting the ozone
layer including costs and effects of possible control measures (see Benedick, 1998).
As shown by these examples, in many cases, there exists an international
agency that collects information transmitted by countries. If the umbrella Conven-
tion setting up this agency is designed in such a way that it is allowed to verify
countries’ information (for example, by sending experts), this agency can to some
extent be used as a certification device. The contribution of this paper is twofold.
First, I show how the presence of information asymmetry about abatement costs
may exacerbate the free-rider problem.2 The second contribution of this paper is
the introduction of a communication stage during which countries have the possi-
bility to exchange verifiable information trough an international agency. In doing
2Here I assume information asymmetry about abatement costs, but we can also build a model
in which information asymmetry is about abatement benefits.
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so, I also propose a new channel to restore the feasibility of an efficient agreement:
pre-play communication with certification.
My analysis is carried out within the framework of the private provision of a
public good under asymmetric information. The public good considered here is the
reduction of some pollutant. To provide this public good, countries incur emission
abatement costs. Each country knows its own abatement cost, but not that of the
other country. An environmental agreement consists of binding commitments to
some emission abatement levels and monetary transfers between countries. The effi-
cient or first-best agreement is the one that maximizes global welfare. Participation
to this first-best agreement is voluntary. This agreement is feasible if all countries
are willing to participate to it and if they all reveal their abatement cost truthfully.
The objective of the model is to analyze the conditions on the economic environment
(preferences, distribution of abatement costs) for which the first-best agreement is
feasible.
I first consider a model without pre-play communication. Due to a trade-off
between ensuring participation to the agreement and ensuring truth-telling, a first-
best agreement is not feasible when the range of the distribution of abatement costs
is too large (in other words, when the information asymmetry is high).3
Then, I introduce a pre-play communication stage, i.e. an umbrella convention
that establishes an international agency entitled to gather information about pri-
vately known abatement costs provided by participating countries. In this model, I
assume that this information is totally verifiable: the international agency can mon-
itor and certify the countries’ privately known information if sovereign countries give
their consent.
The effects of certification are twofold. On the one hand, the information
asymmetry between countries is reduced. On the other hand, the country certifying
its abatement cost loses the possibility to misreport this abatement cost, and thereby
may see its monetary transfer in the first-best agreement reduced.
Compared to a model without the possibility of certification, I show that there
exist three types of equilibrium in the two-stage game. First, for low levels of in-
formation asymmetry, there is always one country using the certification agency as
3Similar inefficiencies were pointed out in related setups. In the context of public good
economies, Laffont and Maskin (1979) have shown that no truthful and efficient mechanisms may
exist if individual rationality constraints are taken into account. In the private goods case, My-
erson and Satterthwaite (1983) showed the impossibility of attaining ex-post efficiency with an
incentive-compatible and individually rational mechanism.
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a commitment device to truthfully disclose its abatement cost. The induced reduc-
tion of information asymmetry allows countries to reach the first-best agreement for
all realizations of abatement costs. Second, for intermediate levels of information
asymmetry, there is still one country using the certification agency, but the first-
best is not implementable for all realizations of abatement costs. Finally, when the
information asymmetry is very high, it is possible to find transfer schemes such that
both countries decide to reveal their type through the certification agency before
negotiations. In this case, the first-best is achieved for all realizations of abatement
costs. Due to this high information asymmetry, the probability that only one certi-
fication is sufficient to reach the first-best is very low, so countries do not have an
incentive to free-ride on each others’ certification. Therefore, even if countries have
the possibility to get rid of information asymmetry and implement the first-best
agreement, there still exist economic environments for which a first-best agreement
is not feasible. This is due to the fact that it is impossible to design transfers that
avoid free-riding by one country in the use of certification.
Some papers have developed specific applications of the mechanism design the-
ory to environmental economics (e.g. Rob, 1989; Baliga and Maskin, 2003; Caparros
et al., 2004; Konrad and Thum, 2014 or Helm and Wirl, 2015). The model the clos-
est to the one developed in this paper is that of Martimort and Sand-Zantman
(2015). They also highlight a trade-off between solving free riding due to asymmet-
ric information and due to voluntary participation and analyze the characteristics of
a second-best mechanism. They show that the optimal mechanism admits a simple
approximation by menus. By contrast, my paper proposes a channel to restore the
feasibility of the first-best agreement, i.e. pre-play communication with certification.
There exists an extensive literature on verifiable communication in the con-
text of mechanism design. Some papers focus on the question of identifying an
appropriate form of the Revelation principle (e.g. Forges and Koessler, 2005; Bull
and Watson, 2004; Bull and Watson, 2007; Deneckere and Severinov, 2008). More
recently, Hagenbach et al. (2014) focus on the conditions to reach full disclosure
of privately held information when the players can make pre-play certifiable state-
ments. In another context, Benoˆıt and Dubra (2006) slightly modify a variety of
auction models by adding a preliminary stage in which one player can send a veri-
fiable signal revealing his private information before the auction. They show that a
player will reveal all of his information in equilibrium, even though this lowers his
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ex-ante payoff. In this paper, I focus on the private provision of a public good.4
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 lays out the main
assumptions of the two-country model. Section 3 shows the effect of asymmetric
information on the feasibility of the first-best agreement. In section 4, I introduce
pre-play communication. I conclude in section 5.
2 The model
2.1 The setting
There are two countries, i = 1, 2, that exert some non-negative pollution abatement
efforts ai. Global abatement benefit is simply the total quantity of abatement, i.e.
(a1 + a2). Each country i receives a share of this global benefit: bi(a1 + a2), where
bi > 0 and b1 + b2 = 1.
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Countries are heterogeneous in terms of their marginal cost of abatement. By
exerting abatement effort ai, country i incurs a cost of
1
2θi
a2i . For tractability, I
adopt a quadratic form where θi can be interpreted as the characteristic of the
technology of country i.6 Finally, country i may receive a transfer ti for undertaking
the requested abatement. Country i’s utility function is given by:





The parameter θi is privately observed by country i. The types θi are indepen-
dently drawn from the same uniform distribution defined on the support [θ, θ¯], with
0 < θ < θ¯. The cumulative and probability distribution function are respectively
given by F (θi) = (θi − θ)/(θ¯ − θ) and f(θi) = 1/(θ¯ − θ). The mean is denoted by
E[θ]. The country with the highest θi is the most efficient at undertaking abatement
efforts. I denote the set of states of the world as: Θ = [θ, θ¯]× [θ, θ¯]
For future reference, I define an economic environment as follows:
Definition 1 An economic environment Ω consists of:
4Note that in public good games, some papers have analyzed the role of pre-play cheap talk.
See for example, Palfrey and Rosenthal (1991) and Agastya et al. (2007).
5This formulation is similar to McGinty (2007)
6This type of abatement cost has been used in other papers about international environmental
agreements: Hoel and Schneider (1997), Kolstad (2005) or Martimort and Sand-Zantman (2015).
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• A range for the distribution of types ∆θ = (θ¯ − θ);
• Individual marginal benefits from abatements (b1, b2).




Definition 2 The first-best abatement levels (aFB1 , a
FB
2 ) = (θ1, θ2) are the abatement
levels that maximize the global welfare:
(aFB1 , a
FB







The most efficient countries in terms of abatement are those that abate the
most at the first-best. In this paper, I will investigate whether these abatement
levels can be implemented under asymmetric information about abatement costs
and voluntary participation to an agreement.
2.2 Mechanisms
A mechanism is an agreement concluded between both countries and it consists of
abatement levels ai and transfers ti for each country.
7 By the revelation principle,
there is no loss of generality in restricting our attention to direct and truthful revela-
tion mechanisms (Myerson, 1982). A direct revelation mechanism, y = (a1, a2, t1, t2),
is composed of a level of abatement for each country ai : Θ×Θ → R that describes
the abatement effort of each country as a function of countries’ reported types, and
a transfer ti : Θ × Θ → R that describes each country’s received transfer from un-
dertaking the requested abatement effort as a function of countries’ reported types.
I denote the utility of country i of type θi from the direct revelation mechanism
y(θˆ1, θˆ2), where θˆi are the reported types for each country i, by:





Since in this paper, I am interested in the implementation of the first-best
abatement levels (aFB1 , a
FB
2 ), I define the first-best agreement as follows:
7Including transfers in environmental agreements is often explicit. Article 11 of the Kyoto
Protocol allows for the possibility of monetary transfers from developed to developing countries
through the Global Environment Facility.
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2 ) is the first-best agreement where a
FB
i = θi
for i = 1, 2
The expected utility of country i under this first-best agreement is given by:
V FBi (θi) ≡ Eθj [Vi(yFB(θ1, θ2)|θi)] = (bi −
1
2
)θi + biE[θ] + Eθj [t
FB
i (θ1, θ2)] (2)
where Eθj [.] denotes the expectation over the possible types of country j.
To be implementable, a mechanism must satisfy three constraints. First, as
countries are privately informed, the mechanism must be incentive compatible. Sec-
ond, the mechanism must ensure that both countries want to join the agreement
(i.e. individual rationality). Finally, there is also a budget balance constraint. These
constraints are detailed below.
Bayesian incentive compatibility. Bayesian incentive compatibility of the mech-
anism y(., .), implies that the expected utility of country i must satisfy:
Eθj [Vi(y(θi, θj)|θi)] = max
θˆi∈[θ,θ¯]
Eθj [Vi(y(θˆi, θj)|θi)] (3)
In other words, truth-telling gives country i the highest possible expected utility,
provided the other country j does. By pretending to be a little bit less efficient in
terms of abatement, i.e pretending to be of a type θi − , a country of type θi can
abate at the same level as the less efficient type θi −  but at a lower marginal cost.
The difference in terms of marginal cost is:
Eθj
[





a2i (θi − , θj)
2θi
]
To ensure truth-telling, the mechanism must reward therefore the most efficient
types by an extra amount,
Eθj [Vi(y(θi, θj)|θi)− Vi(y(θi − , θj)|θi)]
that is equal to this difference in terms of marginal cost. By letting  tend to zero,
we get the result of lemma 1:
Lemma 1 The direct revelation mechanism y(., .) satisfies Bayesian incentive com-
patibility if and only if Eθj [a
2
i (θi, θj)] is weakly increasing in θi and






Where V˙i(.) is the derivative of the utility function with respect to the announcement
of country i.
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It immediately follows that an incentive compatible mechanism must give a greater
payoff to the most efficient countries. As, in the sequel, I focus on incentive com-
patible direct revelation mechanism, I will simplify the notation of the expected
utility:
Eθj [Vi(y|θi)] ≡ Eθj [Vi(y(θi, θj)|θi)]
This is the expected utility of country i from the direct and truthful revelation
mechanism y(θi, θj) when this country i is of type θi ∈ [θ, θ¯].
Budget balance. I assume that no external source of funds is available and that
there is no waste of resource.8 Hence, the ex-ante budget-balance constraint implies
that:
Eθ1θ2 [t1(θ1, θ2) + t2(θ1, θ2)] = 0 (5)
where Eθ1θ2 denotes the expectation over the types of countries 1 and 2. The in-
terpretation of this constraint is that the overall surplus generated by countries’
abatement efforts should be equal to their overall payoff. Note that there is no loss
of generality in using the ex-ante budget balance constraint instead of the more nat-
ural ex-post budget balance constraint (t1(θ1, θ2) + t2(θ1, θ2) = 0) because, following
Bo¨rgers and Norman (2009), if types are independent, for every ex-ante budget-
balanced mechanism, there exists an ex-post budget-balanced mechanism such that
the allocation rule is unchanged and the interim expected payments are unchanged
for all agents.
Individual rationality. Finally, participation to an environmental agreement y
is voluntary. The outside option is the non-cooperative equilibrium. It consists for
country i in choosing its abatement level to maximize its own utility. Since countries
choose their abatement non-cooperatively, there is no transfer, i.e. t1 = t2 = 0.






2 ) is the non-cooperative equilibrium if and only
if





• tN1 = tN2 = 0
8I can relax this budget balance constraint, i.e. by assuming linkages with agreements in other
areas (e.g. low tariffs conditional on ratifying the environmental agreement) but the main results
would remain unchanged.
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Countries do not internalize the benefit of their abatement level on the other country
and there is an under-provision of emission abatements. Note that aNi is a dominant
strategy (i.e. the abatement chosen is the same whatever the behavior of the other
country).The expected utility of country i under the outside option is denoted:
V Ni (θi) ≡ Eθj [Vi(yN |θi)] =
b2i
2
θi + b1b2E[θ] (6)
Since countries know their type when deciding to join a treaty, the interim
individual rationality constraint requires that:
Eθj [Vi(y|θi)] ≥ V Ni (θi) for i = 1, 2 (7)
3 A model without pre-play communication
3.1 Complete information benchmark
As a benchmark, I will first assume that countries’ types θi for i = 1, 2, are public
knowledge, so that abatement and transfer levels do not have to be incentive com-
patible. However, the first-best mechanism must still satisfy budget balance and
individual rationality.
Proposition 1 In all economic environments Ω, the first-best agreement yFB is
implementable for all θi ∈ [θ, θ¯] (i = 1, 2).
Proof Using equations (2) and (7), the transfers necessary to make each country
willing to participate to the first-best agreement are given by:










Using the budget-balance constraint t1(θ1, θ2) + t2(θ1, θ2) = 0, the condition for









In equation (10), θ1
b22
2













The result follows since the term on the left hand side is always negative, while the
term on the right hand side is always positive. 
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3.2 Two-sided asymmetric information
Now, I assume that the countries’ types θi are private information. Combining
interim individual rationality (7), bayesian incentive compatibility (4) and budget
balance (5) yields the following proposition:
Proposition 2 Given an economic environment Ω, the first-best agreement yFB











Proof See appendix A. 
The left hand side of condition (11) is the relative range of the distribution of
types ∆θ/θ. By lemma 1, we know that to ensure truth-telling the most efficient
countries must be given the highest payoffs. If information asymmetry, measured by
the range ∆θ, is high, the incentives of the most efficient types for misreporting are
big. Avoiding such free-riding requires large compensations, i.e. large information
rent, for those very efficient countries.
The right hand side of condition (11) depends on countries’ asymmetry in terms
of marginal benefit from abatement. Specifically, L0 is the lowest when countries are
symmetric, i.e. when b1 = b2 = 0.5. To interpret this result, I define the expected
collective gains from reaching the first-best agreement (or the efficiency gains) as
the difference in expected welfare between the first-best agreement W FB and the
non-cooperative equilibrium WN :
Eθ1,θ2 [W
FB −WN ] = Eθ1,θ2 [V FB1 (θ1) + V FB2 (θ2)]− Eθ1,θ2 [V N1 (θ1) + V N2 (θ2)]
With the ex-ante budget balance constraint (5), these efficiency gains must be fully
redistributed among countries. Using equations (2) and (6) yields:
Eθ1,θ2 [W













When countries are symmetric, the non-cooperative equilibrium welfare is closer to
the first-best welfare. the efficiency gains that can be redistributed among countries
to ensure participation and truth-telling are lower. These expected gains are the
lowest for symmetric countries.
In other words, condition (11) states that efficiency gains must be higher than
information costs (measured by the level of information asymmetry). To understand
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this result, we need to figure out the impact of the economic environment Ω on
individual rationality and incentive compatibility.
As the budget balance constraint must always be satisfied, the compensations
granted to the most efficient types are limited by the necessity to ensure participation
of all types, including the least efficient ones. When the range of the distribution
of types is very large or when efficiency gains are low, one cannot find incentive
compatible transfers that implement the first-best abatement levels and that give
all types (including the least efficient ones) strictly more than their expected non-
cooperative payoffs. For economic environments that does not satisfy condition (11),
we can say that there is a tension between incentive compatibility, budget-balance
and individual rationality that prevents countries from reaching the first-best agree-
ment. Compared to the benchmark case, the presence of asymmetric information
reduces the set of economic environments for which countries can implement the
first-best agreement.
Transfers under the first-best agreement. When the economic environment
satisfies condition (11), the first-best abatement levels aFBi (θ1, θ2) = θi can be im-
plemented using transfers that satisfy Bayesian incentive compatibility, individual
rationality and budget balance. We have shown that if a mechanism is bayesian
incentive compatible, the expected utility of each country i must satisfy equation
(4). Integrating this equation yields:








where Vi(θ) = Eθj [Vi(y|θ)]. Using equation (1) and rearranging terms, we can recover
the transfers under the first-best agreement:
Eθj [t
FB
i (θi, θj)] = t
FB
i (θi) = (a
FB
i (θi)− aNi (θi))− (aFBi (θ)− aNi (θ)) + tFBi (θ)
where ai(θi) = Eθj [ai(θi, θj)] is the expected abatement level and ti(θi) is the ex-
pected level of transfer.9 This can also be rewritten as:
tFBi (θi) = (1− bi)(θi − θ) + tFBi (θ)
This expected first-best transfer is increasing in country i’s type. The higher
the type θi, the higher the term (a
FB
i (θi)−aNi (θi)), i.e. the more the country should
9When deciding to join or not an agreement and to tell their true type or not, countries only
know their private type θi.
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abate in the first-best agreement. It is then necessary to give efficient countries
a higher transfer to give them an incentive to reveal truthfully their type. This
transfer negatively depends on bi: the higher the marginal benefit from abatement,
the higher the contribution of the country to the mechanism. This makes sense: if
a country cares a lot about the environment, it will be ready to contribute more in
order to implement the first-best agreement.
This transfer also depends on tFBi (θ), which is the first-best transfer for the
least efficient type. This transfer must satisfy the individual rationality and I show
in appendix A, that if it is the case, then individual rationality is also satisfied for
more efficient types.
3.3 One-sided asymmetric information
Finally, as it will be useful in the next section, I also derive the condition under
which the first-best agreement is implemented when only one country has private
information. Considering that the resolution of this problem is very similar to the
previous case, I just report the main results. Details can be found in Appendix B.
Assume that country i’s type is public knowledge and country j’s type is
privately known. I first derive the following Lemma, which states that, given the
economic environment, the first-best agreement can be implemented if country i is
sufficiently efficient in terms of abatement.
Lemma 2 When country i’s type is public knowledge and country j’s type is pri-
vately known, the first-best agreement yFB is implementable ∀θj ∈ [θ, θ¯] if and only









Proof See Appendix B. 
As before, the intuition behind this result relies on the efficiency gains:
Eθj [W








These gains are increasing in the publicly known type θi. The more efficient in
terms of abatement country i is, the larger the efficiency gains available to solve the
tension between participation and truth-telling are.
The critical type θ˜i is the threshold from which the first-best agreement can
be implemented when country i’s type is public knowledge. It is increasing in the
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relative range of the distribution ∆θ
θ
: the tension between incentive compatibility,
budget-balance and individual rationality is stronger for larger ranges of the distri-
bution. A higher value of θi is then necessary to solve the tension.
If θ˜i ≤ θ, the first-best agreement yFB will be implementable for all possible
publicly known types θi ∈ [θ, θ¯]. This will be the case if the economic environment









It is then possible to derive a proposition similar to Proposition 2 (see Ap-
pendix B):
Proposition 3 Assume that country i’s type is public knowledge and country j’s
type is privately known. Given an economic environment Ω, the first-best agreement










with L0 < L1.
4 A model with pre-play communication
Most of the existing environmental treaties (e.g. the Montreal Protocol, the Helsinki
Protocol...) were preceded by an umbrella convention that set up the institutions
under the auspice of which subsequent protocols were negotiated. This pattern of
development implies that countries communicate before agreeing on pollution re-
duction targets. This communication generally takes place through an international
agency (e.g. UNECE, UNEP...) that gathers information transmitted by countries.
In some cases, if countries allow it, the agency could monitor and certify this
private information. Certification reduces the information asymmetry and consti-
tutes a channel to restore the feasibility of the first-best agreement. Nevertheless,
for this channel to be helpful in reaching the first-best agreement, countries must
have incentives to undergo certification. The effect of certification is twofold. On
the one hand, by revealing a country’s type, certification reduces the information
asymmetry, which was responsible for the tension between incentive compatibility,
budget-balance and individual rationality constraints. On the other hand, certifi-
cation implies the loss of the information rent for the country revealing its type.
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Countries might thus have an incentive to free-ride on each others’ certification (i.e.
to stay privately informed) in order to keep their information rent.
To include the possibility of pre-play communication and certification, I modify
the model presented in section 3 by considering a preliminary stage (stage 1 or pre-
play communication stage) in which countries decide simultaneously whether or not
to allow the international agency to monitor and certify their type. This action of
certification is taken at an ex-ante stage, i.e. when countries do not know their own
types.10
In stage 2, countries at least privately know their types and they negotiate an
environmental agreement using the direct revelation mechanism that implements the
first-best agreement if it is feasible and they resort to the non-cooperative outcome
otherwise. This is the abatement stage. Note that the non-cooperative outcome yN
is independent of information, i.e. whether or not one country has revealed its type
in stage 1. Indeed, transfers are equal to zero for all types and the non-cooperative
abatement level only depends on each country’s type (aNi (θi) = biθi). I solve this
game backward.
Remark 1 For economic environments satisfying (θ¯−θ)
θ
≤ L0, the fact that countries
undergo certifications does not help them to reach the first-best agreement: the first-
best is implementable in stage 2 with or without certification (see proposition 2). The
only effect of the possibility to certify its type is to change the first-best transfers.
Independently of the certifications undertaken in stage 1, the equilibrium outcome of
this two-stage game is that the first-best is always implemented. For this reason, I
concentrate on economic environments satisfying ∆θ
θ
> L0 in which the first-best is
not implementable without certification.
4.1 Stage 2: abatement game
The equilibrium outcome in stage 2 depends on the actions taken in stage 1. If both
countries have accepted transmitting their private information to the certification
agency in stage 1, the equilibrium outcome in stage 2 is the first-best agreement
yFB (because there is complete information). If no country has accepted, then the
equilibrium outcome in stage 2 is the non-cooperative equilibrium yN .
10It would be more realistic to assume that countries decide whether or not to undertake cer-
tification at an interim stage (i.e. when each country knows its own abatement cost), but the
resolution of the two-stage game would become intractable. This resolution would require looking
at beliefs conditional on observable moves and non-equilibrium beliefs.
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If only country i has allowed the international agency to certify its type θi, the
equilibrium outcome in stage 2 depends on the economic environment and on the
value of country i’s type (see Lemma 2 and Proposition 3).
Figure 1 summarizes these findings for stage 2. For economic environment
below the threshold L1 the equilibrium outcome in stage 2 is for sure the first-best
agreement yFB if at least one country has allowed for certification in stage 1. For
economic environments such that ∆θ
θ
≥ L1, the equilibrium outcome in stage 2 is
the first-best agreement yFB either if both countries have allowed for certification
in stage 1 or if the only country that has given its consent in stage 1 turns out
to have a type θi ≥ θ˜i. In other cases the equilibrium outcome in stage 2 is the
non-cooperative equilibrium yN .
Figure 1: Implementation of the first-best agreement depending on the economic
environment
yFB  implementable if both countries 
reveal their types or if country that 
reveals its type has θi ≥ θi  
yFB  implementable if 
one country reveals 
its type 
yFB  always implementable yFB  cannot be implemented with two-sided 
asymmetric information
L0 L1 (θ −θ )
θ
4.2 Stage 1: pre-play communication
Countries simultaneously choose whether they allow the international agency to
certify their type (i.e. they agree on the role and the prerogatives of the international
agency). Let si denote the action (or strategy) of country i in stage 1. The set of
possible strategies is S = {C, NC} for each i, where C means that country i allows
for certification and NC means that country i refuses it. To find the equilibrium
strategies of this game, I analyse countries’ best responses.11
11I only look at pure strategies.
16
Best responses of country i
If sj = NC, i.e. if country j refuses certification by the international agency, the
best response of country i is to allow for it for all economic environments satisfying
∆θ
θ
> L0. Indeed, by certifying its type, country i increases the probability that the
first-best agreement is implemented in stage 2: this probability increases from zero
to (1 − F (θ˜i)), where F (.) is the cumulative density function of the type θi. Since
the first-best (which satisfies the individual rationality constraint) gives a higher
expected utility than the non-cooperative equilibrium, country i will always prefer
to reveal its type through the certification agency. An immediate consequence of
this best response is that there will always be at least one country that allows
certification of its type at the equilibrium of stage 1.
If sj = C, if country j allows the international agency to certify its type, the best
response of country i is more difficult to determine. Intuitively, the incentive for
certification will depend on the economic environmentΩ (which determines the gains
from reaching an agreement and the probability that country j is sufficiently efficient
in terms of abatement) and on the comparison between the transfers received in the
first-best in the two sub-games (i.e. when both countries allow for certification and
when only country j allows for certification).




2 , t1, t2), the mechanism chosen to implement the







the mechanism chosen to implement the first-best if only country j has allowed for
certification. The expected utilities of country i under each strategy (C and NC)
are the following:
• If country i allows for certification in stage 1 (si = C), there is complete in-
formation in stage 2 and the first-best is always implementable using a mech-













i + b1b2)θj + ti(θ1, θ2)
]












θi + ti(θ1, θ2)
)]
(13)
The first term of the right hand side of (13) is the expected utility under the
non-cooperative equilibrium (see equation (6)). The second term is the extra
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gain from reaching the first-best agreement. Because individual rationality
constraint is satisfied, this extra gain is always positive.
• If country i does not allow for certification in stage 1 (si = NC), the first-best
is implementable using a mechanism y′(θ1, θ2) if and only if θj ≥ θ˜j. Denote
(1− F (θ˜j)) the probability that θj ≥ θ˜j, where F (.) is the cumulative density





θi + b1b2θj|θj < θ˜j
]









i + b1b2)θj|θj ≥ θ˜j]
]



















The first term on the right hand side of (14) is the same as in (13) (the
expected utility under the non-cooperative equilibrium) and the second term
is the expected extra gain from reaching the first-best agreement, which is
implementable only if country j is sufficiently efficient.
Comparing expressions (13) and (14) confirms our intuition that the best re-
sponse of country i when sj = C depends on (1) the transfers used to implement
the first-best abatement levels in stage 2 (either with certification of both countries
Eθ1,θ2 [ti(θ1, θ2)] or with country j’ s certification only Eθ1,θ2 [t
′
i(θ1, θ2)|θj ≥ θ˜j]), (2)
the relative intensity of preferences over abatement (i.e. values of bi and bj), and
(3) the probability that country j is sufficiently efficient (1 − F (θ˜j)). The two last
factors are determined by the economic environment Ω.
There are potentially many transfers Eθ1,θ2 [ti(θ1, θ2)] or Eθ1,θ2 [t
′
i(θ1, θ2)|θj ≥
θ˜j]) that implement the first-best agreement in each case. In order to find the best
response of country i when country j allows for certification, I have the following
assumption
Assumption 1 Country i will accept the certification of its type if and only if this
country can be sure to obtain a higher expected utility by acting in this way. Other-
wise it prefers to stay privately informed.
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Given this assumption, the best response of country i to sj = C will be to
allow for certification ( si = C) if, given the economic environment Ω, there exist
mechanisms with transfers ti(θ1, θ2), such that (13) > (14) for all t
′
i(θ1, θ2). If such
transfers ti(θ1, θ2) do not exist, country i prefers to stay privately informed ( si =
NC).
The equilibrium in stage 1
It is now possible to characterize the equilibrium of the game in stage 1. Given
the best responses detailed above, we have the following lemma:




there is at least one country allowing the international agency to certify its type at
the equilibrium of stage 1.
Moreover, both countries i will give their consent to certification at the equi-
librium in stage 1 if there exist second-stage mechanisms with transfers ti(θ1, θ2)
(that implement the first-best under complete information) such that (13) > (14)
for all t′i(θ1, θ2), i = 1, 2. In this case, for both i, the best response of country i is
si = C when country j’s strategy is sj = C. If such transfers ti(θ1, θ2) does not exist
for both i, then there is one country that prefers to stay privately informed when
the other country allows for certification.
Intuitively, it is easier to find such transfers ti(θ1, θ2) when F (θ˜j) is high (or
equivalently when θ˜j is high). For high values of F (θ˜j), the probability that the
certification of country j’s type allows to reach the first-best is low, so that country
i has a greater incentive to also give its consent in stage 1 in order to guarantee
that the first-best is implemented in stage 2 (with complete information). For low
values of F (θ˜j), country i may have an incentive to free-ride on the other country’s
certification in order to stay privately informed and enjoy an information rent if the
first-best is achieved in stage 2. This is shown formally in Lemma 4:
Lemma 4 The equilibrium in stage 1 is unique and is such that both countries allow
for certification if and only if the economic environment satisfies:
θ˜1 − θ
θ¯ − θ +
θ˜2 − θ
θ¯ − θ ≥ 1 (15)
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= L2 > L1 (16)
For economic environments that do not satisfy (16), the equilibrium in stage 1 is
unique and is such that one country allows for certification while the other country
stays privately informed. The identity of the country allowing for certification will
depend on the transfers used to implement the first-best agreement in stage 2, i.e.
t′i(θ1, θ2) and ti(θ1, θ2).
Proof See Appendix C. 
The threshold L2 achieves its minimum at the point b1 = b2 = 0.5 (i.e. when
countries are symmetric). The intuition behind this result is the same as for the
threshold L0: the more symmetric countries are, the lower the efficiency gains are.
It is easier to give incentives to countries to undergo certification (i.e. to design
transfers such that they both allow for certification) if these countries are more
asymmetric (in terms of marginal benefits) or equivalently if expected collective
gains from cooperation are higher.
Remark 2 Assume, for instance, that bi < bj. Then, θ˜i < θ¯ for all ranges of the
distribution of types, while θ˜j may be such that θ˜j ≥ θ¯(i.e. F (θ˜j) = 1). This is the








b1(b2 − b1) = L
3 > L2
where L3 is obtained by substituting θ¯ to θ˜2 in equation (12). Therefore, for ranges
above L3, F (θ˜j) = 1 and condition (16) is automatically satisfied.
When (1−F (θ˜j)) = 0, the best response of country i is always to accept certification
in stage 1 for all ti(θ1, θ2) and all t
′
i(θ1, θ2) because country j is never sufficiently
efficient for its certification to allow countries to reach the first-best agreement.
Country i will thus never have an incentive to free-ride on certification of country
j’s type.
4.3 Solution of the two-stage game
Three cases must be distinguished:
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Case 1: Economic environments satisfying L0 < ∆θ
θ
≤ L1
In these economic environments, θ˜i = θ, so that the equilibrium outcome of
this game is the first-best agreement for all realizations of types, as soon as one
country allows for certification, which will always happen along the equilibrium
path by lemma 3.
Case 2: Economic environments satisfying L1 < ∆θ/θ < L2
There is only one country allowing for certification in stage 1. Since θ˜i >
θ, certification by only one country is not always sufficient to reach the first-best
agreement in the second stage. The country that certifies its type must be sufficiently
efficient in terms of abatement. As a result, depending on the type of the country
undergoing certification, the equilibrium in stage 2 may be either the first-best
agreement yFB or the non-cooperative outcome yN .
Case 3: Economic environments satisfying ∆θ
θ
≥ L2
For these economic environments, both countries allow for certification at the
equilibrium of stage 1. The equilibrium outcome in stage 2 is thus the first-best
agreement yFB, for all realizations of types.
Consolidating cases 1-3
We can now state a proposition about the possibility to implement the first-
best abatement levels for all realizations of types in this two-stage game (similarly
to Proposition 2):
Proposition 4 Given an economic environment Ω, the first-best agreement yFB























with L1 < L2
For economic environments satisfying ∆θ
θ
∈ (L1, L2), there exist some realiza-
tions of types for which the first-best is not implementable.
Proposition 4 states that certification can restore the feasibility of the first-best
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agreement for all types in two cases: for high or sufficiently low levels of information
asymmetry.
If information asymmetry is high (threshold L2), there exist mechanisms such
that both countries optimally undergo certification. No country has an incentive to
free-ride on the other’s action because the risk to implement the non-cooperative
equilibrium (outside option) in stage 2 is substantial and so a country’s expected
benefits of keeping its information rent are very low.
For lower levels of information asymmetry, there is always one country that
prefers to free-ride on the certification of the other country. Due to this free-rider
problem, the first-best agreement will not be part of the equilibrium path for all
types. Nevertheless, if information asymmetry is particularly low (threshold L1),
both countries are sufficiently efficient in terms of abatement to solve the tension be-
tween incentive compatibility, budget-balance and individual rationality. Free-riding
in the certification stage is no longer a problem and the first-best is implemented in
stage 2 for all types’ realizations.
The set of ranges (L1, L2) where the first-best is not necessarily part of the
equilibrium path for all types is the largest when b1 = b2 (countries are symmetric).
This corresponds to the case in which the expected collective gains from the first-best
agreement are the lowest. Clearly, certifications can more easily solve the tension
between incentive compatibility, budget-balance and individual rationality if those
efficiency gains are high.
5 Conclusion
This paper takes a mechanism design approach to study the effect of asymmetric
information about abatement costs on the feasibility of an efficient environmental
agreement when participation is voluntary. Due to the tension between incentive
compatibility and participation, a first-best agreement cannot always be reached.
Then, I introduce a new channel to restore efficiency: pre-play communication or
the possibility for countries to disclose truthfully their type through a certification
agency.
I show that it is possible to find transfer schemes between countries such that a
certification agency is created and at least one country allows this agency to certify
its type. Adding the possibility of certification restores the feasibility of the first-best
agreement if the level of asymmetry is either high (certification of both countries’
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types) or low (certification of one country’s type).
One illustrative example of the model developed in this paper could be the
climate change negotiations, even if this problem is substantially more complex (e.g.
due to aggregate uncertainty about the physical process causing climate change and
its impact on human beings?). Climate negotiations started with the 1992 United
Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC). This is an umbrella
convention without any emission reduction targets, or interpreted in the light of
the model, a pre-play communication stage. The UNFCCC tries, in some sense,
to reduce information asymmetry between parties by providing some information
about countries’ private costs and benefits of climate change. Indeed, by signing the
UNFCCC, countries committed themselves to provide the Conference of the Parties
with information, e.g. about their GHG emissions and their regional programs
to mitigate climate change (which can be seen as an indication of the political
willingness to implement climate change policies). However, this obligation covered
only industrialized countries.
This paper suggests that before negotiating a new climate change agreement,
it could be useful to reinforce the UNFCCC by requiring, for example, that all
countries report their GHG emissions and their technologies to reduce these GHG
to the secretariat of the UNFCCC that should have the possibility to verify, at least
partially, this information. The model also shows that transfers between industri-
alized and developing countries will play a crucial role. These transfers can take
the form of monetary side payments through the Global Environment Facility (see
article 11 of the Kyoto Protocol). By choosing appropriate transfers derived from
the mechanism design theory, countries may have an incentive to disclose their pri-
vate information through an international certification agency established by the
UNFCCC. In the light of the model developed in this paper, this can help countries
to reach an efficient climate agreement.
The model uses a lot of simplifying assumptions to highlight the effects of
pre-play communication. A first important extension could be to consider that
abatement efforts are not totally observable, so that there is a problem of moral
hazard during the implementation of the first-best agreement. Second, in this paper,
I assume that information transmitted during the pre-play stage is verifiable and
can be certified by an international agency. A more realistic assumption would be
that this information is only partially verifiable, such that abatement costs are still
privately known but the beliefs about these abatement costs are modified by the
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first-stage action of information transmission.
Appendices
Appendix A: two-sided asymmetric information
Proof of Lemma 1
First, assume that the mechanism implementing the agreement y = (a1, a2, t1, t2) is
Bayesian incentive compatible. From equation (3), we get that Eθj [Vi(y(θi, θj)|θi)]
is the maximum of concave functions of θi. It is thus concave, absolutely continuous
and almost everywhere twice differentiable. As a consequence, if a mechanism is
Bayesian incentive compatible, it follows that:






Moreover, take θi ≥ θˆi and rewrite the expected indirect utilities for these two
types:
Eθj [Vi(y(θi, θj)|θi)] = Eθj
[





Eθj [Vi(y(θˆi, θj)|θˆi)] = Eθj
[





From equation (3), we can also write the two following inequalities:
Eθj [Vi(y(θi, θj)|θi)] ≥ Eθj
[





Eθj [Vi(y(θˆi, θj)|θˆi)] ≥ Eθj
[























which implies Eθj [a
2
i (θi, θj)] ≥ Eθj [a2i (θˆi, θj)] for θi ≥ θˆi.
Reciprocally, assume that (4) holds and that Eθj [a
2
i (θi, θj)] is weakly increasing
in θi. Then, Eθj [Vi(y(θi, θj)|θi)] can be written as:









Thereby for θi ≥ θˆi,








To have incentive compatibility, we need that condition (3) is satisfied, which is
equivalent (see first part of the proof) to the inequality (17):
Eθj [Vi(y(θi, θj)|θi)] ≥ Eθj
[







We need to check if


















i (s, θj)− a2i (θˆi, θj)]
2s2
ds ≥ 0
This is the case since Eθj [a
2
i (θi, θj)] is weakly increasing in θi. 
Proof of Proposition 2
We need to delineate the conditions to have a budget-balanced, Bayesian incentive
compatible and interim individually rational first-best agreement.
Step 1 : The first step of the analysis consists in consolidating the Bayesian Incen-
tive compatibility and the budget-balance constraints. By lemma 1, we know that
Eθj [V˙i(y(θi, θj)|θi)] ≥ 0. Therefore, the expected utility function is increasing in the
country’s type θi. Integrating (4) yields:








with Vi(θ) = Eθj [Vi(y(θ, θj)|θ)]. This is the expected utility of country i when
Bayesian incentive compatibility constraint is satisfied. The expected total welfare
when Bayesian incentive compatibility constraints are satisfied for both i is thus
given by:
Eθ1θ2 [V1(y(θ1, θ2)|θ1)]+V2(y(θ1, θ2)|θ2)]


















Integrating (19) by parts, we finally obtain the following expression for the
expected total welfare:

























where f(θi) = 1/(θ¯ − θ) because of the uniform distribution of types.
The budget-balance constraint requires Eθ1θ2 [t1(θ1, θ2) + t2(θ1, θ2)] = 0.
12 Re-
member that the utility function of country i of type θi when reported types are
(θ1, θ2) is given by:




+ ti(θ1, θ2) (21)
Consolidating equations (20) and (21) using the budget-balance constraint
yields the following equation:
Eθ1θ2
[
































This is the necessary and sufficient condition for budget-balance and Bayesian in-
centive compatibility
Substituting for aFB1 and a
FB
2 , in the previous equation, we get the necessary
and sufficient condition for budget-balance, Bayesian incentive compatibility and
first-best agreement:
V1(θ) + V2(θ) = θ (22)
Step 2: The next step consists in adding the interim individual rationality con-
straints.
Eθj [Vi(y|θi)] ≥ V Ni (θi) =
b2i
2
θi + b1b2E[θ] for i = 1, 2 (23)
Note that for a mechanism that implements truthfully the first-best abatement
level aFBi the type θ is the critical type since, at this first-best and with incentive
12Following Bo¨rgers and Norman (2009), if types are independent, for every ex-ante budget-
balanced mechanism, there exists an ex-post budget-balanced mechanism such that the allocation
rule is unchanged and the interim expected payments are unchanged for all agents. Particularly,
for this proof, I use corollary 1 of Bo¨rgers and Norman (2009).
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compatibility (see Lemma 1),




Which implies that V FBi (θi)− V Ni (θi) is increasing in θi.13
Hence, a necessary and sufficient condition for the participation constraint
(23) to hold everywhere is that it holds at θ, the lowest type. Summing the two
individual rationality constraints (23) at the lowest type yields:






θ + 2b1b2E[θ] (24)
Combining (22) and (24), we get the necessary and sufficient condition for the
existence of an ex-post efficient (first-best agreement) mechanism that is individually
rational, Bayesian incentive compatible and budget-balanced:
θ = V1(θ) + V2(θ) ≥ 1
2
θ + b1b2θ¯
This amounts to check:
(b1 + b2)




Which is equivalent to condition (11) in Proposition 2 because b1 + b2 = 1. 
Appendix B: One country allows for certification (Proof of
lemma 2 and Proposition 3)
Assume that country 1’s type θ1 is publicly known and only country 2 has private
information about its type θ2. A direct revelation mechanism has the following
outcome function:
y(θ1, θˆ2) = (a1(θ1, θˆ2), a2(θ1, θˆ2), t1(θ1, θˆ2), t2(θ1, θˆ2))
where θ1 is the publicly known type of country 1 (i.e. country 1 cannot lie about its
type) and θˆ2 is the reported type of country 2. The first-best agreement y
FB will
13Optimal contracting under type-dependent reservation utilities has been extensively analyzed
in the literature in the case of a single agent (Lewis and Sappington, 1989 and Jullien, 2000) and
in the case of multiple agents (Carrillo, 1998). Here, due to the convexity of the outside option
and the fact that the distribution of types is uniform, we are in a simple case in which the critical
type is at the bottom of the distribution.
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be implementable in stage 2 if and only if there exists a direct revelation mecha-
nism y(θ1, .) such that (i) the ex-post incentive compatibility and ex-post individual
rationality constraints of country 2 are satisfied:
V2(y(θ1, θ2)|θ2) = max
θˆ2∈[θ,θ¯]
V2(y(θ1, θˆ2)|θ2)




and (ii) the interim individual rationality constraint of country 1 is satisfied:
Eθ2 [V1(y(θ1, θ2)|θ1)] ≥ V N1 (θ1) =
b21
2
θ1 + b1b2E[θ] (25)
The rest of the proof is similar to the proof of Proposition 2. The first step of
the analysis consists in consolidating the budget-balance constraint and the ex-post
incentive compatibility constraint for country 2.
Using a similar proof as for Lemma 1, it is easy to show that the direct reve-
lation mechanism y(θ1, .) is incentive compatible for country 2 if and only if





Integrating this equation yields:






Remember that the utility function is given by:




+ ti(θ1, θ2) (27)
The ex-ante budget-balance constraint requires that Eθ2 [t1(θ1, θ2)+t2(θ1, θ2)] =
0. Consolidating the budget-balance constraint and equations (26) and (27), and














This is the necessary and sufficient condition of existence of a first-best agreement
that is budget-balanced and ex-post incentive compatible for country 2.
The next step consists in adding the individual rationality (or participation)
constraints. We look at the ex-post participation constraint of country 2 and at
the interim participation constraint of country 1 for a fixed type θ1. The interim
participation constraint of country 1 is given by :
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Eθ2 [V1(y(θ1, θ2)|θ1)] ≥ V N1 (θ1) =
b21
2
θ1 + b1b2E[θ] (29)
Using the same type of argument as in Proposition 2, we can show that θ
is the critical type for the ex-post participation constraint of country 2. Hence, a
necessary and sufficient condition for the participation constraint of country 2 to
hold everywhere is that it holds at θ. Therefore, the ex post participation constraint
of country 2 is given by:
V2(y(θ1, θ)|θ) ≥ V N2 (θ1, θ)
At the first-best abatement levels, summing up both participation constraints yields:







Combining (28) and (30), we get the necessary and sufficient condition for
incentive compatibility of country 2, individual rationality and budget-balance at















This amounts to check:
θ1 ≥ θ˜1 = b1
b2





which is exactly the condition in Lemma 2.














= L1. The proof for the situation in which
country 2’s type is public knowledge and country 1’s type is private information is
totally symmetric. 
Appendix C: Proof of lemma 4
Before turning to the proof, I define the mechanisms used depending on the actions
taken in stage 1. The set of strategies for each country i is S = {C, NC}. Denote
by (s1, s2) ∈ S × S the actions taken in stage 1.
• If (s1, s2) = (C,C) (complete information in stage 2), y(., .) is the mecha-
nism chosen to implement the first-best abatement levels in stage 2 (satisfying
budget balance and individual rationality);
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• If (s1, s2) = (C,NC) (one-sided asymmetric information), y′(., .) is the mech-
anism chosen to implement the first-best abatement levels in stage 2 when
country 1 allows for certification (satisfying incentive compatibility for coun-
try 2, individual rationality and budget balance);
• If (s1, s2) = (NC,C) (one-sided asymmetric information), y′′(., .) is the mech-
anism chosen to implement the first-best abatement levels in stage 2 when
country 2 allows for certification (satisfying incentive compatibility for coun-
try 1, individual rationality and budget balance);.
Remember that in stage 1, countries do not know their own type. From the
best responses derived in the paper, it is clear that at least one country allows for
certification at the equilibrium of stage 1. I want to delineate the conditions under
which both countries have simultaneously an incentive to allow for certification in
stage 1. I thus need to show that it is possible to design a mechanism y(θ1), θ2) such
that at the first-best abatement levels:
• When the strategy of country 1 is s1 = C, the expected utility of country 2 is
such that:
Eθ1 [V2(y(θ1, θ2)|θ2)] ≥ E[V2(y′(θ1, θ2)|θ2)] (31)
∀y′(θ1, θ2) satisfying incentive compatibility for country 2, individual rational-
ity and budget balance.
• When the strategy of country 2 is s2 = C, the expected utility of country 1 is
such that:
Eθ2 [V1(y(θ1, θ2)|θ1)] ≥ E[V1(y′′(θ1, θ2)|θ1))] (32)
∀y′′(θ1, θ2) satisfying incentive compatibility for country 1, individual rational-
ity and budget balance.
• The budget-balance constraint t1(θ1, θ2) + t2(θ1, θ2) = 0 is satisfied.14
Step 1: Rewriting the ex-ante budget-balance constraint
The ex-ante budget-balance requires that:
Eθ1θ2 [t1(θ1, θ2) + t2(θ1, θ2)] = 0
14We can use (as in previous proofs) the ex-ante budget-balance constraint (see Bo¨rgers and
Norman, 2009).
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2 , this constraint can
be rewritten as:






























Step 2: Consider that the strategy of country 1 in stage 1 is s1 = C
Country 2 will also allow for certification if and only if
Eθ1θ2 [V2(y(θ1, θ2)|θ2)] ≥ Eθ1θ2 [V2(y′(θ1, θ2)|θ2)]
with
Eθ1θ2 [V2(y




θ2 + b1b2θ1|θ1 < θ˜1
]










2 + b1b2)θ1|θ1 ≥ θ˜1
]
+ (1− F (θ˜1))Eθ1θ2 [t′2(θ1, θ2)|θ1 ≥ θ˜1]
where t′2(θ1, θ2) is a first-best transfer that is incentive compatible and individually
rational.
Rearranging terms yields (see equation (14)):
Eθ1θ2 [V2(y













2(θ1, θ2)|θ1 ≥ θ˜1]
]
Step 3: Consider that the strategy of country 2 in stage 1 is s2 = C
Country 1 will also allow for certification if and only if
Eθ1θ2 [V1(y(θ1, θ2)|θ1)] ≥ Eθ1θ2 [V1(y′′(θ1, θ2)|θ1)]
with
Eθ1θ2 [V1(y




θ1 + b1b2θ2|θ2 < θ˜2
]










1 + b1b2)θ2|θ2 ≥ θ˜2
]
+ (1− F (θ˜2))Eθ1θ2 [t′′1(θ1, θ2)|θ2 ≥ θ˜2]
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where t′′1(θ1, θ2) is a first-best transfer that is incentive compatible and individually
rational. Rearranging terms yields (see equation (14)):
Eθ1θ2 [V1(y













1(θ1, θ2)|θ2 ≥ θ˜2]
]
Step 4: Maximum expected transfers
As shown in steps 2 and 3, both Eθ1θ2 [V1(y
′′(θ1, θ2)|θ1)] and
Eθ1θ2 [V2(y
′(θ1, θ2)|θ2)] depend on the transfer obtained under the first-best agree-
ment, if implemented, Eθ1θ2 [t
′′
1(θ1, θ2)|θ2 ≥ θ˜2] and Eθ1θ2 [t′2(θ1, θ2)|θ1 ≥ θ˜1]. We want
that whatever this transfer, country i always prefers to allow for certification, when
the other country also allows for certification. The maximum expected (budget-
balanced) transfers that each country can expect when the other country allows for
certification is a transfer such that it extracts all the gains from reaching the first-




2(θ1, θ2)|θ1 ≥ θ˜1] = Eθ1θ2 [b21θ2 −
b22
2
θ1|θ2 ≥ θ˜2] (33)
Eθ1θ2 [t
′′
1(θ1, θ2)|θ2 ≥ θ˜2] = Eθ1θ2 [b22θ1 −
b21
2
θ2|θ1 ≥ θ˜1] (34)
Equations (33) and (34) give the maximum expected transfer that country i may
require when country i stays privately informed while country j certifies its type.
The maximum expected utility that each country can reach by staying privately
informed when the other country allows for certification is then given by:
Eθ1θ2 [V1(y































Step 5: Consolidating steps 1-4
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Remember (step 1) that the ex-ante budget-balance constraint can be written
as:






















A mechanism y(θ1, θ2) must satisfy this budget-balance constraint and be such
that both countries have an incentive to allow for certification:
Eθ1θ2 [V1(y(θ1, θ2)|θ1) + V2(y(θ1, θ2)|θ2)]
≥ Eθ1θ2 [V1(y′′(θ1, θ2)|θ1) + V2(y′(θ1, θ2)|θ2)]

















































































1 ≥ (1− F (θ˜2)) + (1− F (θ˜1))













Which is the condition in Lemma 4. 
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